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CHAPTE

R

7'ho are Joint

Tort-Feasors.

It is a familiar doctrine that
sued jointly,

or severally and that

pay all the damages caused by their
ly put by

Littleton thus,

Notes,

:

joint -,wrohg-doers

one may be compelled
ioint act.

7his is

be
to
quai,-4*

"Then divers doe a trespass the

same is joynt or severull at
wrong is done".

I.

the wi'll of hi.

to whom the

(Coke upon Littleton, Butler & Hargreave's

fec. 37:').

At the time Littleton wrote, this rule

7,.as

of comparatively easy application, since the interests of the
business world were not so complex as now.

','he vast increase

of corporations doing business in distant places, our easy
means of communication enabling persons a thousand miles apart

to be in

constant coinmuication,

transportation of

and the tre:.

endous

assengers and merchandise all tend to make

the application of the riule difficult, in that it is often
not easy to determine who are,

and who are not

joint

wrong-

doers.
The editor (73

'.

ec.

137)

lays down this

termininj the question, "All persons who command,

rule for

de-

instigate,

promote, encourage, advise, cooperate in, aid or abet the cora

mission of a trespas.s by another or who apirove of it after
it is done,

if done for their benefit, are co-trespassers '~i t

the person committing the trespass, and are each liable as
principals to

the sa:ie extent, and in the same manner as if

they had perfom-ied the 7,rongful act

themselves."

,T:is
rule,

'7rhile it covers all those cases in which the wrong-doer is 12
personally enaired in the trespass, does not help us in the
border-line cases where the parties

omit some duty whereby

they become liable, or where each separately
someforce which subsequently combines

;uts in motion

"Tith another and the

combined forces are the proximate cause of an injury.
is in these ver- cases that the
the words

,ut it

real difficulty arises, in

of the editor in (A.S;.R. 250) "The onlY portion of

the law upon the subject, about which there seems to be any
difficulty or doubt relates

'to the cases in w,%Iich a person

has been injured by distinct nehliyent acts,

or omissions, of

whlIich two or more persons were guilty, but who were not partners not

co-owners nor enga-ed in any common design or enter-

prise".
These border-line cases 'ay be roiuishly divided into, pcrhaps two classes, first, where the i,-rties fail in some duty,
and thus become liable, and second, where

the acts

of the par-

ties are separate and distinct won conmitted, but the

sub-

t a1
sequently combine and beco>,:C

cause of the injury.

1 ro-imate

mons

Of the first
Y. 319)

of

class the casc

zir

is a veryj good illrstration.

'.

.verson

defendants

.

(121

'1.

in this

case oyined three lots in severality, a d on these three lots
three brick stores;

the

front of these stores consisted of

one thick brick wall into which the Dartitions separatin, the
stores were built.

hese stores Y'rere burned, and this front

wall, about sixty feet hiyh ,.as left standing together with
parts of the partition '"ais.

Shortly after the fire this

front wall bewan to bulge, and it continued so to do until
it fell, and killed the
inF along the
jointly

street.

plaintiff's intestate, w o ,%ras passThe

co urt held that

the defendants

,,Tere

liable.
In

Klaider v.

MicGrath(35 Pa.

St.

128)

arisinpj

on a simi-

lar state of facts the court held the several defendants liable in

the following lan:;uage.

"'"!ere

the keeping of the

wall safe was a comnmon duty, Lnd a failure
mon neglect,

the rule

to do so -,as a co,_,

often recognized in that when an injury

has resulted from the concurrent negligence of several persors
they arejointly responsible."
(Brayt.

Vt.

See

also PecikhaEr

v.

'Urlington

13, )

The second class is illustrated by sever~l ',cli reasoned
cases which iuay be divided into

(a) those where the

separate

and independent acts have united in putting some new force or
aprent into motion which has caused theinjuryr.

(b) 'rinere the

separate and independent acts have created a condition which
acted upon by a force of nature, has done harm. (c) W7here the
separate and concyrrent acts of negligence of the parties together

caused injury.

(a) Stone v. Dickinson (5 Allen, 29) well illustrates
this division.

Here nine different creditors separately got
the
out writs, and gave them to saum officer and he, acting upon
them arrested the plaintiff.

The arrest was illegal, and up-

on the plaintiff suing the defendants the question came up
whether they were j",intly liable.

The parties did not act in

concert but the arrest and imprisonment was the result of the
several writs which were sued simultaneously by the officer
employed by each individual.
jointly lihble, saying:

The court held the defendants

"Pre-concert or knowledge is not es-

sential to the commissionof a joint trespass.

It is the fact

that they all united in the wrongfyl act, or set on foot the
agency by which it was committed, that renders them jointly
liable to the person injured.
ven &

T.Y&

(See also Cole -rove v. lew Ha-

Harlem Ry. Cos. (20 NT. Y. 49.)

for a dictum to t1-

same effect.
(b)As an example I will cite ,later v. Mlercereau (4

138), the facts of which were substantiall

these.

,i1.

The de-

Y.

fendant 'gras one of several contractors at work on a building
adjoining the plaintiff's premises.

One nf the duties of the

defendant was to put up a water-spout to carry the ",rater from
the roof to the sewer.

This he did so negligently as not to

acoomplish its ptrpoese.
Bryant, building the

Another firm of contractorsMoore

vault and sidewalk in front of the

building, did this also very negligently.

The

result was that

upon there coming a heavy rainstorm large quantities of surface water from the street and the roof of the building flowed over on to plaintiff's premises, soake* into the basement,
he
where, hIad goods stored,

and injured them.

It was found by the referee that the damages

were causal

by the negligent way in which the water-spout, and the vault
and sidewalk, had been constructed.

The questinn before the

court was whetlier the Cefendant would be held for all
ages, and it was held in the affirmative.

the dam-

The court said?"It

is true the defendant and Moore and Bryant were not gointly
interested in reference to the separate acts which produced
the daimages.

Although the'y acted independently of each other,

they did act at the same time in causing the damages, each
contributing toward it, and although the acts were each alone
and of

itself might not have caused the entire injury, under

the circumstances presentod there is no good reason -,;wy each

should not be liable for the damages caused by the different
acts of all.

The water from both sources co mngled together,

and ;ecame one body concentrating at the same locality,soaking through the mall into plaintiff's premises and injuring
plaintiff's property; and it cannot be said t -at the water
which the defendant's negligence caused to flo.r upon the plaintiff's premises, and which became a portion of all whichcame
there did not produce the damage complained of.
through which each of the

".'ewater

arties were instrumental in injur-

ing the plaintiff ,,as one mass and inseparable, and no distinction can be made between the different sources from whenoe
it flowed, so that it cnuld he claimed that each caused a sepl
arate and distinct injury for which each one is separately responsible. "
In Kansas City v. Slangstrom (36 Pac. R. 706) decided in
1894,

the cause of action arose from t,,n parties obstructing

a stream, so that it over-flowed plaintiff's premises, and although they acted separately and independently, the court said
"The acts of either one would have occasioned injury, and as
both contributed in obstructing the stream a j 6 int liability
arises against them."
The

is

test in

all

these cases for c! etermining whether theye

a joint liability or not see-s to be the one adopted by the

court in Consolidated

,iachine Co.

"Whether or not the negligence
in producing the injurious
The

cases which

v. Keifer

(134 Ill. 481),

of each directly

contributed

result."

lay Jown the doctrine,

that

whcrc

the

separate and concurrent acts of the two or more parties cause

a single injury to a third

person

tlnose

injur

caus,

may be held jointly or severally, have arisen outof collisiors
caused by the negligence of the servants of commoMl

curriers.

Such was the case of Colegrole v. New Haven and Harlem Ry.
Cos.

(20

N.

Y.

492)

It

-ras

ield in

that

panies were jointly Liable, the court
ion set
in

in

contact

motion a
',ith,

..nd

third
1

ro

ucod thi

s in

"

: aie

d
l

its

movement

evil to the

_st

l 4'_ -ri
1

the two cor

saying, "Had the collis

body -.7hick. in

no i0old r.vson can ba as,ii
s case

case thaat

heir
no

ner

j iin'

had come

-lai.tiffi-,
;i-bili

c;io

;

at on."
case

The case

of Cuddy v.

colkision, plaintiff's

HOrn

(46 Mich.596) was anothero.

intestate having been killed in the

collision between two steamboats, the
by the negligence of those

collision being caused

in charge of the

court held that the proprietors

steamboats.

The

of the two steamboats were

jointly liable, and said in the course of the opinion,"An act
wrongfully done by the joint a. ency or co-operation of several persons will render them liable jointly or severally.

The

injury done in the case resulted from the collision
by the contemporaneous

caused

act, of the two separate vwrong-doers,

who not acting in concert yet by their simultaneous acts put
in motion the ai-encies, :hich tol:,ther caused the single injury, and fori this the injured party could
a single compensation."

receive brt

Seein addition Grand Trynk Ry. Co. v.

Cummings (106 U. S. 700).
T'Ie result of the cases summed up would seem to be this.
That asidc from the cases where all are actively engaged
in the joint commission of an injury, TTiich casesare clear
and cause

no trouble, there are two classes of joint-tort-

feasors:
First, where two or more persons are under a joint duty
to perform some act, a failure to perform the same causing injury, will make those under the obligation, liable as joint
tort-feasors.
Second, two or more parties are liable as joint tortfeasors, even though their acts when committed were entirely
separate and distinct, if thoseacts united in puttin.,--ome
new force or agent into motion, or creatcda conrition which
acted upon by a force of nature has done harm, or the acts
while sCparate and distinct were concurrent acts of negliFence which together caused the injury, providirn

however, t:t

that the acts so combined hre the proximate cause of the inju-

ry complained of.

Where, however, the several acts committed

each give rise to a separate cause of action when

done,

1ut

the results of these severzl torts unite, and as a consequence
do further injury, then the partires in fault
as joint wrong-doers, but

cannot be held

each one is liable only

for the

daina -es which can be traced to the tort committed by him.
This is well brought out by the two cases of Chipman v.
Palmer (77 11. Y. 51) and Little Schuylkill Navigation, Railroad and Coal Co. v. Rishard's Administrator (57 Pa. St.

142)

In Chipman v. Palmer the facts were tilese, the plaintiff was
keeping a boarding house on the banks of a stream, there were
also anumber of other hotels and boarding ho, ses

s it'71-ted,

t

sdigh-

er up nn the stream.
These had been accistomed to empty refuse and

sewurage

into the stream, and as a result it became contaminated to
such an extent as to bec ome a nuisance,.
portion of plaintiff's boarders left.

As a consequence a

Plaintiff sued defend-

ant, one of these who emptied s -Iwerage into the stream for tio
7,hole damages caused by the loss of her boarders, urging that
all who contributed to the
as joint tort-feasors.

fouling of the water were liable

The court held that they were not

joint tort-feasors saying the injury ",*.as

occasioned by the

discharge of sewerag-e frowi the Dremises of the defendant and

other owners of lots into the creek, separately and independI

ently of each other.

Aihe ri ht of action arises from the dis-

char:e into the stre -,m and the nu.tance is
of the acts.

nly a consequence

T3.e liabilitr commences with the act of the de-

fendant upon his own premises, and this act is separate, and
independent of, and without any rejard to the acts of others,
the defendant's act being several when it was comnitted, cannot be made joint because of the consequences which followed
in connection with others

,,ho had done the same or a similar

act."
In Little Schuylkill Co. v. Richards the faet.s were as follow
A number of mine bwners had deposited coal dirt, and refuse
from their respective mines,

on the banks, and in the stream

upon which Richards had his mill.

This dirt, and refuse wash-

ed down filled the dam and destroyed the w.tur power by which
the mill was run.
jury that,"If

The judge in the court below charged the

at the time the defendants were engaged in

thro

ing the coal-dirt itto the river about ten miles above the
dam,

the sa e thin7 -as being Cone at the other c6llieries ar.

the defendants knew of this, they were

liable for the combin-

ed result of all the series of deposits from the mines above
from 1851 to 1858", the period during wiich the dam mas filled
Upon appeal this charge was held erroneous, "The fallacy lies

said the court,
dirt by the
bility.

"in the assumption that the deposit of the

stream in the baijn is the foundation of the

It is the immediate causc of the

injury, but

[.round of action is the negligent act above.

The

lia-

t.e

right of ao-

tion rises upon the acto~throwing the dirt into the stream,
this is the tort while the deposit below is only a consequenc(;.

Therefore the liability began above with the defend-

ant's act upon his own land, and this act was wholly separate
and independent of all concert with others-

This tort was sev

eral when it was conmitted and it is difficult to see how it
afterward became joint because its consequences united with
other consequences.
crease his injury.

The

union of consequences did not in-

If the dirt were deposited

mountain high

by the stream his dirt filled only its own space, and it was
Oadeneither morenor less by the
In Blaisdell v. Stephen (14

4ccretions."
:rv.

15)

it appeared that te'

defendants had pnermitted waste water to flow from their respective premises into a natural slough or channel througrh
which it finally

reachc,

,.laintiff's drain ditch, and injured

it upon a certain occasion.

It was held that they were not

joint tort-feasors because as the court said,

"In this case

the right of action arises, if at all, upon the act of allo-ing the waste water to run into the slough from the

land of

the defendants.

Tis is the tort. Thedamage to th(; drain

ditch below is only a consequence."
subject set

U.Tiller v. HighlnCd Ditch Co.

v. Casey (2, Pa. St. 482),
Wf

,-or further cases on thc

Rep. 882),

(87 Cal. 430),

7ard

Citr of Detroit v. Chaffee (37 U.

Sellick v. Hall (47

Conn. 260)

7Thile at law in cases like Blaisdell and Stephens, and
the other cases cited above, the defendants causing the consequential injury, cannot be sued as joint tort-feasors, yet
there is abundant authortty that they ma: all be joined as defendants in a suit in equity for the purpose of obtaining,; at
injunction against them.
The'Mining Debris Case
Hillman v.

(8 Sawyer , U. S. Cir. ,628);

ewington (57 Cal. 56)

People v. Gold Run etc. Co. (66 Cal. 138);
Blaisdell v. Stpphen (14 'Nev. 17);
Goodyear v. Schaefer (5.7 Md. 1);
Thorp v. Brumfitt (8 L. R. Ch. App. 656);
Lamberton v. Mellish (L. P. 1894 3 Ch. 153).

CHAPTER

II,

a'hat aounts to a Satisfaction for a Joint

This question becomes very ivportant

Yong.

wuere the injured

party wishes to proceed against several of the joint wron'rdoers, or having sued one and finding him w-)rthless wishes-to
0

get compensation from another.
T'he courts are all a,)reed that suit can be brought a! airt
all or any number of the trespassers, and prosecuted until tie
injured ;,arty has obtained satisfaction.
point there is

a wide divergence

tutes satisfa tion.

of opinion as to wat consti-

The general doctrine

at IT riance with the law as developed in
cases in

But riiKht at this

in

this country is

Bngland.

T-e early

that country do not seem to be alto-,et_'her clear on

the point, but the case of Brown

v.

'octten (Cro.

Jac.

73)

started a line of decisions i-'iich estab1ished squarely the
proposition that a jud inent in
al joint tort-feasors

is

an action a ainst one of s eve-

a bar to an action aiainst others far

the same cause, although stch judgment remains wholly unsatisfied.
The grounds upon w'hich these decisions have been placed
are two in

number,

first

on the

,rolind of public policy to

prevent multiplicity of suits, a :d second the' legal. maxim,
transit in rem judicatures, the cause of action is changed into
inatter of record, which is of a higher nature Ahd the infertor remedy is merged in the higher"".
King v.Hoare,(13 Mees/ & Welsb, 493)
Brinsmead v.

Harria n (L.

The English doctrine has
in this country.

R.

7 C. P.

547).

never obtain much recognition

In Livingston v. Bishop (1 Johns. 290) decid

ed in 1806, Chancellor Kent after a thorough examination of
the authorities held that Brown v. Wootton was not in accordance with the earlier English authorities and refused to follow it.

He waid,"If there can be but one recovery it is vain

to say that the plaintiff mry bring separate suits, for the
cause that happens to be first tried may be used by way of
plea puis darrien continuance tthat are in arrears.

defeat the other actions

The more rational rule appears to be

that where you elect to bring separate actions for a joint
trespass you may have separate

recoveries and but one satis-

faction, and that the plaintiff may elect de melioribus damnis,

and issue his execution accordingly; and that where he

has made his election he is concluded by it, and that if he
should afterwards proceed against the other defendants they
should be relieved on payment of their costs."

In Sheldon v. Kibbe

(ZConn. 214) Hosmer Ch. J.,

after

discussinga and quoting from the opinion of Chancellor K.ent
in Livingston v. Bishop (supra) said, "The common law founded
as it isupon reason, and allowing nothing that is nugatory
much less that is pernicious, will sanction no ixutilit7Y or
absurdity.

Now what can be more absurd than to authorize the

pendency and proceeding of twenty separate actions at-ainst
persons concermed in a joint trespass, and after t;-e accumulation of vast expense to hold thatthe first judgment bars the
other suits."
It remained after the decision of these two cases for tih
United States Supreme
English doctrine in

Court to complete the overthro:.r of the

th is

country,

,hich it

did fb_ the case of

Lovejoy v. Murray (3 '.all. i), after a thorough examination c
the authorities both Englith and American, and in the following language: "If we turn from the examination of adjudged
cases, wThich larg-ely preponderate in

favor of t)ic doc-

trine that a jud,-ment without satisfaction is no bar to look,
at t:qe question in the light of reason, that doctrine commends
itself to us still more strongly. The whole theory of the opposite view is based upon technical, artificial and unsatisfactory reasoning."

.......-

-

-

"J7e

are therefore of it

the opinion that nothing short of satisfaction can make good

a plea of former judgment in trespass,

offered as a bar in an

action a ainst another joint trespasser -,-.ho is not -)art,, to
the first judgment."
The general American doctrine now is that different suits
may be

brought and rtrosecuted until the plaintiff obtains a

real satisfaction.

Osterhout v. Roberts(8 Conn. 43)

Lovejoy v. Lurray (3 77all, 1)
Sheldony. Kibble

(3 Conn. 214);

Livingstonlv. Bishop (1 J. 1'.

290).

But it is held in some few states that final judgment ard
execution or an order for an execution against one of several
joint trespassers is a discharge of all the others.
Allen v. WTheatley (3 13lackf. 332);
Fleming v. McDonald (50 Ind. 278);
White v. Philbrick, (5 Me.

147)

Page v. Freeman (19 Mo. 421);
Boardman v. Aler (13 1.1ich.

77).

1T'hen, however, the injured party ,ives

a release to one

of several Ooint tort-feasors the universal doctrine is that
all are discharged, this doctrine goes as

far back as Little-

ton who says,"1V.en divers doe a trespasse the same is jognt

cr

severall at the will of him to whom
.the wrong is done, yet if
he

release to one of them all are discharged."

(Coke upon Lit-

tleton, (Gutlerand .Talreavesl
Coche v.

Jeniaor

(Ho!).

notes)

375)

3:5)

Ayer v. Ashmead (31 Conn. 447";
Lrown

v.

Uarsh (7

K -ickerbocker
Luble v.

v.

Freeman

Spurr v.

.

Vt.

327)

Culvcr (8
(2 HL r).

tid. Pq.

Conn.

&

Co.

111);

ijf. 38);

(28 At.

Rep.

528).

It seems that the proper method to pursue
wishes

to settle

'/ith one

tort-feasor :,ithout

if a person
losing his rif±

a%,ainst the other is to covenant not

to sue, since the

have held th-_at this does not operate

as a release.

'7iller v. Fenton (11 Pai--e,
Duck v.

:I&,eu

(L. R. ,

,.

B.

18)
Div. 1892, Vol. 2)

courts

C H A P T B R III.
0----------------

Can there be Indemnity between

Joint Tort-Feasors?

It is a familiar maxim of the law that there can be no
contribution ot redress between joint tort-feasors.

Declared

for the first time in the case of Merryweather v- Nixon (8 T.
R. 186) decided in 1799, it has been repeated over and over ag,-ain by the courts, and applied often blindly to facts which
should never have come under the rule.

Tihe rule itself it

se-ms to me is but an application of a tLeneral doctrine that
where two parties arein pari delicto the court will not interfere to help either party but will leave them just where it
finds them.

This is well illustrated by the case of Atkins v.

Johnson (43 Vt. 78).

The plaintiff in this action was pub-

lisher of a newspaper and brought the action upon an agreement in writing made by defendant, that if plaintiff would p
publish in his newspaper an article entitled "A Jack at all
save
trades exposed" the defendant would -7

consequence thereof.

"h

Iim harmless from the

The article proved to be a libel, and

t-he judgment was recovered against plaintiff for thepublicatinn thereof, which judgment he was obliged to pay.

It was

held by the court that the parties were joint wrong doers, ayd
that the agreement could not be enforced.

Pierpont , C. F.,

